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OPINION 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
Hermann Bendemann, District Judge, Presiding 
Argued and Submitted July 3, 1926 
Filed May 1, 2005 
Before: Alex K., * Bucephalus and Godot,** Circuit Judges. 
Opinion by Judge Alex K. *** 
* No relation. 
** Sitting by designation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 291. Judge Godot was not 
present at oral argument but will read the transcript as soon as he gets here. 
*** As is the custom in the federal courts today, every word of this opinion 
was written by Judge K.'s law clerk, Sasha V. (The common delusion that judges 
actually write the stuff they author has led to some misunderstandings. See, e.g., 
Thompson v. Calderon, 120 F.3d 1045, 1062 n.3 (9th Cir. 1997) (en bane) 
(Reinhardt, J., concurring) (referring to "a [surprising] communication from Judge 
K").) The judge merely read the text and fiddled with the language (but Sasha V. 
managed to reverse most of the changes in later drafts). It is well known that the 
judge never reads the footnotes. 
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OPINION 
ALEX K., Circuit Judge: 
FACTS1 
The late Josef K., a thirty-something male, claims that 
"[s]omeone must have slandered [him], for one morning, without 
having done anything truly wrong, he was arrested." T.R. 3. 
The procedural history of this case is complicated and patchy, 
but what is clear is that, after being rude to his arresting officers, 
appellant came late to his initial interrogation and disrupted 
the proceedings.2 He refused to attend further interrogations, 
submitted no evidence or brief in his defense and repeatedly 
accused judicial authorities of corruption and incompetence. 3 
He was apparently convicted, though the conviction does not 
appear in the record. On the eve of his thirty-first birthday, K. was 
taken to a quarry by two guards and executed. "With failing sight 
K. saw how the men drew near his face, leaning cheek-to-cheek to 
observe the verdict. 'Like a dog!' he said; it seemed as though the 
shame was to outlive him." T.R. 231. As it has. 
K. appeals, alleging unlawful arrest, inadequate notice, due 
1The trial record in this case has been published as Franz Kafka, The Trial 
(Breon Mitchell trans., Schocken Books) (1925). We regret the delay in disposing 
of the appeal, but we've been busy with more important matters. See, e.g., Alex K. 
& Sidney T., Don't Split the Ninth Circuit!, Wall St. J., Nov. 10, 2004, at A16. 
2Tuis is not the only case where appellant has been "loud, emotional, 
expressed paranoid notions and lacked self control." See Alameda County Soc. 
Servs. Agency v. Joseph K. (In re Randi K.), 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 5427, 
*3 (June 9, 2004). 
3We could end right here, for what else need there be said? Nevertheless, we 
will continue so no one can accuse us of "prejudging the case" or giving appellant 
"short shrift." No doubt, appellant will be much happier to lose based on a post­
judged, long-shrift opinion. 
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process violations, systemic corruption, ineffective assistance of 
counsel and actual innocence. We affirm. See, e.g., State v. Sams a, 
1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 2483, at *1  (May 29, 1991) ("We 
affirm."). 
ANALYSIS 
1. The government claims the case was mooted by appellant's 
death. But appellant casts aspersions on the legitimacy of the legal 
proceedings against him, and his calumny cannot be left 
unrebutted. Not contra Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 16 n.8 
( 1998) (damage to reputation of mere parties does not defeat 
mootness). 
The government seems to argue, though incoherently, that we 
lack jurisdiction because the events in question took place abroad. 
K. responds that the Supreme Court's rulings in Sosa v. Alvarez­
Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004), and Republic of Austria v. 
Altmann, 124 S. Ct. 2240 (2004), give us jurisdiction over events 
anywhere, anytime. We are inclined to take K.'s word for it, as we 
can't bring ourselves to slog through over eighty pages of the 
4 Supreme Court Reporter. 
2. K. challenges the authority of the officers to enter his 
apartment, claiming that he was unlawfully "assault[ ed] . .. in his 
own lodgings." T.R. 6. But K. waived this argument when he got 
out of bed and told the arresting officer he was going to ask his 
landlady about the disturbance. The record clearly shows that K. 
"realized at once that he shouldn't have spoken aloud, and that by 
doing so he had, in a sense, acknowledged the stranger's right to 
oversee his actions." T.R. 4; cf Christian v. United States, 394 
A.2d 1, 38 (D.C. 1978) (per curiam) ("[T]he defendant can waive, 
through his silence, a constitutional right . ... ") . 
K. urges that we ignore his oversight because "that didn't seem 
important at the moment." T.R. 4. But police actions are to be 
judged by their objective reasonableness at the time, not in 
hindsight or according to defendant's shifting mental state. See 
Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 249 ( 1991) (objective 
4what gets into them sometimes? See also McConnell v. FEC, 124 S. Ct. 619 
(2003) (168 pages of Supreme Court Reporter never read by anyone). 
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reasonableness under the circumstances); cf In re Samsa, 86 B.R . 
863, 865 (Banla. W.D. Pa. 1988) (court must consider law at time 
of transaction). 
Even though he was under arrest, K. was still allowed to 
"carry[] on [his] profession" and was not "hindered in the course 
of [his] ordinary life." T.R. 17.5 Also, K. admitted that the arrest 
"ma[de him] laugh," T.R. 47, and that, to the extent the incident 
tended to "spread the news of [his] arrest [and] damage [his] 
public reputation, and in particular to undermine [his] position at 
the bank," "none of this met with the slightest success." T.R. 48. 
Without cognizable harm, K. lacks standing to contest his arrest. 
De minimis non curat lex. 
3. While we're on the subject of trifles, we address K.'s claim 
that he was arrested without a warrant. At the time of the arrest, K. 
showed the guard his identification papers and demanded, in 
return, to see the guard's papers and the arrest warrant. T.R. 8. Not 
only was he not shown these, he was also told that the guards 
"weren't sent to tell" him why he was arrested. T.R. 5. 
We see no problem. Before ordering an arrest, the authorities 
"inform themselves in great detail about the person they're 
arresting and the grounds for the arrest." T.R. 8. They don't "seek 
out guilt among the general population, but . . . [are] attracted by 
guilt . .  . . That's the Law." T.R. 8-9; see also Deel. of Penal 
Colony Officer ("Guilt is always beyond a doubt."); Gerstein v. 
Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 113 (1975) (arrest warrant not necessary for 
arrest supported by probable cause). 
4. K. argues that he did not receive adequate notice of the 
initial hearing: He wasn't told the hour of his hearing and he 
complains that the court didn't "describe(] the location of the room 
more precisely," alleging that this somehow amounts to "strange 
5He was fortunate to have guards who were friendly with him, though this 
"exceed[ed] [their] instructions" and was "against all regulations." T.R. 5. K.'s 
guards even offered to hold his personal possessions for safekeeping while his case 
was pending instead of forcing him to take his chances with the depository, which 
would have sold the possessions at below-market prices and might never have 
returned the proceeds to him. T.R. 5-6; see also T.R. 81 ("[I]t's a tradition that the 
undergarments belong to the guards .... "); Psalms 22:18 (King James) ("[T]hey 
divide my garments among them, and for my raiment they cast lots."); Washington 
v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710 (1997) ("We begin ... by examining our Nation's 
history, legal traditions, and practices." (emphasis added)). 
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carelessness or indifference." T.R. 35, 39. 
K. 's problems are of his own making. Court calendars are 
published, and citizens are presumed to know every word of all 
official publications. See Fed. Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 
380, 384-85 (1947). K. admits that he came an hour and five 
minutes late because he did not "have the least desire to humble 
himself before the commission of inquiry by being overly 
punctual. " T.R. 38. He "decided to observe more than speak " and 
merely said, "I may have arrived late, but I'm here now, " and thus 
"waived any defense of his . . . late arrival. " T.R. 43. 
5. Rather than give it up, K. challenges the substance of his 
initial interrogation. He alleges that the proceedings were 
"sloppy, " indeed, that they were not even "proceedings at all. " 
T.R. 45. We need not delve too deeply into this argument: The 
examining magistrate correctly remarked that, in view of K. 's 
lateness, he had no duty to even examine K., but exercised his 
discretion to make an exception in K. 's case. T.R. 43. We find no 
abuse of discretion. 
But even if we were to reach the merits of K.'s argument, we 
would find it meritless. K. points to the examining magistrate's 
mistakes of fact, notably his erroneous characterization of K. as a 
house painter. T.R. 44. But this mistake was clearly harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt, see Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 
18, 24 ( 1967), since the record does not disclose what the actual 
charge was and we therefore can't say that the mistake was even 
relevant. 
Moreover, with his displays of histrionics and rudeness to the 
examining magistrate, K. "deprived [himself] . . .  of the advantage 
that an interrogation offers to the arrested man in each case. " T.R. 
52-53; see Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 313 (1991) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). This uncooperativeness 
continued throughout the entire course of the proceedings. K. 
"wantonly disturb[ ed] " the legal process and virtually brought the 
"violent measures he had thus far been spared " on himself. T .R. 
251. K. can "do as he wishe[s], but he should bear in mind that the 
high court [can]not permit itself to be mocked. " T.R. 252; see 
Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970) ("[A] defendant can 
lose his right to be present at trial if . . . he . . . insists on 
conducting himself in a manner so disorderly, disruptive, and 
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disrespectful of the court that his trial cannot be carried on with 
him in the courtroom."). 6 
Finally, K. comments that his case "is typical of the 
proceedings being brought against many people. I speak for them, 
not for myself. " T.R. 46-47. This case has not been certified as a 
class action, and to the extent that K. disclaims any challenge to 
harms he himself has suffered, he lacks standing. See Note, 
Standin.p To Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 423 
( 1974). 
6. K. has already waived any claim against his arresting 
officers, leaving only his claims against supervisory officials and 
government entities. See T.R. 83 ("I don't even consider [my 
arresting guards] guilty; it's the organization that's guilty, it's the 
high officials who are guilty."); Monell v. Dep 't of Soc. Servs., 436 
U.S. 658, 690 ( 1978). 
K. produces no evidence for his claim that "an extensive 
organization " of corrupt officials, the purpose of which is 
"arresting innocent people and introducing senseless proceedings 
against them," was behind his arrest, beyond the conclusory 
assertion that "[t]here can be no doubt " about it. T.R. 50; see 
Samsa v. Comm 'r, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 110 1  ( 1981), at *7 
(testimony need not be accepted where it  is "improbable, 
unreasonable or questionable "); Alex K. & Eugene V., Lawsuit, 
Shmawsuit, 103 Yale L.J. 463, 467 ( 1993) ("Chutzpah."). To the 
contrary, the members of our judicial system are conscientious and 
hard-working. Court employees are "poorly dressed, in old­
fashioned clothes; it doesn't make much sense to spend anything 
on clothing, since [they're] almost always in the offices, and even 
8 sleep [there]." T.R. 76. They belong to the Law, and thus are 
beyond human judgment. See Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. ( 13 
Wall.) 335, 347 ( 187 1) (judges have absolute immunity for 
judicial acts). To doubt their dignity is to doubt the Law itself. 
T.R. 222-23. 
6This is so tedious, I wonder if anyone is still reading. For this I ate 6000 stale 
bagels at Gannett House? 
7 But see Sasha V., n Guilty Men, 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 173 (1997) (brilliantly 
proving that proceedings are not fair unless they guarantee release of those who 
are suilty). 
"No kidding. Eugene V. never told me about this. See also infra note 9. 
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7. K.'s most substantial claim is ineffective assistance of 
counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984). 
K. complains that his lawyer, Dr. Huld, didn't summon him for 
over a month, and generally scarcely asked any questions, instead 
sitting across from K. in silence or giving K. empty admonitions 
and useless, self-congratulatory speeches. T.R. 112. After months, 
K. alleges, Huld still hadn't prepared an initial petition. T.R. 177. 
This looks bad, but it's not as if the lawyer was asleep during trial. 
See, e.g., Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336, 348-49 (5th Cir. 
2001) (en bane). 
In any event, we can't rule out that Huld's supposed 
deficiencies were in fact K. 's fault. K. could have contacted the 
lawyer sooner. T.R. 123. His bad experience may be attributable to 
the fact that he was a bad client: He insisted on pursuing a high­
stress professional career and only showed up at times convenient 
to him rather than, like other clients, being "quiet and industrious," 
T.R. 194, abandoning most of his professional commitments, T.R. 
173-74, and sleeping in Huld's house in case Huld needed to talk 
to him, T.R. 182; see also T.R. 192 (client on his knees before the 
lawyer); T.R. 193 (client kissing the lawyer's hand).9 
K. also took the "unheard of . . . and quite insulting" step of 
firing his lawyer during the trial. T.R. 125. Who knows how 
effective Huld would have been if he had been allowed to do his 
job? See, e.g., Smith v. Ylst, 826 F.2d 872, 875-76 (9th Cir. 1987) 
(even a mentally ill lawyer can be effective). At the very least, 
Huld is highly competent. Merchant Rudolf Block, one of Huld's 
longtime clients, testified regarding both Huld's competence and 
considerable personal contacts, T.R. 116, the latter being perhaps 
the most relevant element in determining Huld's ability: While the 
court is impervious to proof brought before it, "it's another matter 
when it comes to behind-the-scene efforts, in the conference 
rooms, [or] in the corridors." T.R. 150-51.10 
Moreover, K. cannot show any prejudice from Huld's failure to 
prepare a petition. Block, for instance, found his own petitions 
"entirely worthless" and containing "nothing of substance," 
9Sounds a lot like a law clerk. See supra note 8. 
10K.'s implicit claim that such contacts are unsavory and should be discouraged 
collapses of its own weight. Is there a courthouse anywhere that does not have 
corridors and conference rooms? Obviously they're there for a purpose. 
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consisting mainly of Latin, general appeals to the court, flattery of 
individual officials, self-praise, and "almost canine servility." 
T .R. 177. What cause have we to believe that K. 's petition, if 
prepared, would have been any better? 
We are tom about K.'s ineffective assistance claim. On the one 
hand, we must promote the strong public policy against defense 
lawyers. "[T]he defense is not actually countenanced by the Law, 
but only tolerated, and there is even some controversy as to 
whether the relevant passages of the Law can truly be construed to 
include even such tolerance." T.R. 114. Lambasting K.'s lawyer 
for incompetence would thus serve an important public purpose. 
On the other hand, we must also give effect to the strong public 
policy of ruling against criminal defendants. See, e.g., United 
States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 2 40 n.64 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en 
bane) (MacKinnon, J., concurring) ("[M]ost defendants are 
·1 ") gm ty .... . 
Though it is a close case, we side with the lawyer, who, after 
all, had to put up with appellant's officiousness. "[A ]lmost every 
defendant, even the most simple-minded among them, starts 
thinking up suggestions for improvement from the moment the 
trial starts, and in doing so often wastes time and energy that 
would be better spent in other ways." T .R. 119. "One should leave 
the task to the lawyers, instead of interfering with them." T.R. 120; 
see, e.g., Florida v. Nixon, 125 S. Ct. 551, 557 (2004) ('"In this 
case, there won't be any question, none whatsoever, that my 
client ...  caused [the victim's] death.' "). 
8. K.'s only clear claim is that he is innocent. See, e.g., T.R. 
47, 148, 2 13. But how can K. credibly claim innocence when he 
admits to not knowing the law? T .R. 9. He might as well dispute 
what the meaning of "is " is. The fuss he makes about how 
innocent he feels "disturbs the otherwise not unfavorable 
impression [he] make[s]." T.R. 14. Especially ludicrous is his 
suggestion that no one can "in general be guilty," as "[w]e're all 
human after all, each and every one of us." T.R. 2 13. That's how 
guilty people always talk. 
In any event-and this is the nub of the matter-we fail to see 
what's so special about being innocent. See Commonwealth v. 
Amirault, 677 N.E.2d 652, 665 (Mass. 1997) ("(O]nce the 
[criminal] process has run its course ... the community's interest 
in finality comes to the fore."). We will assume, for the sake of 
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argument, that K. did not commit the crime for which he was 
convicted and executed. Can we be sure that K. did not commit 
some other, worse crime, that was overlooked? To ask the question 
is to answer it. The law works in mysterious ways and that which 
should be done is presumed to have been done. It follows that that 
which was done needed doing. K. was convicted and executed 
after a legal process that, as we have seen, is unimpeachable. He 
must have deserved what he got. 
CONCLUSION 
K. 's overarching complaint, that "the Law should be accessible 
to anyone at any time" and that he has been denied entry to it, T.R. 
216, "rings hollow." Alex K., Scholarship of the Absurd: Bob 
Bork Meets the Bald Soprano, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 1578, 1583 
(1992). The very existence of these proceedings has provided an 
entrance for K. to defend himself. K. has consistently refused to 
cooperate with court officials' repeated attempts "to straighten out 
his complex case, regardless of the time and cost." T.R. 251. No 
one else could gain admittance here, because this entrance was 
meant solely for him. If he nevertheless remained outside, he has 
only himself to blame. 
AFFIRMED. 
